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Abstract 
Japan was hit hard by the global financial crisis even though its relatively resilient financial 
system initially limited the direct impact. The severe collapse of industrial production that 
followed was no doubt attributable to a confluence of factors, but the paper highlights the 
impact that came from the contractionary effect of global deleveraging on the real economy. 
In this environment, Japan was particularly vulnerable because of the structural changes that 
had taken place over the past decade in its trade and industrial structures. Vector 
autoregression analysis confirms that, as a result of these structural changes, Japanese 
output became much more responsive to output shocks in the advanced markets of the 
United States and Western Europe. 
The structural changes had two components. First, over 90% of Japan’s exports consisted of 
highly income-elastic industrial supplies, capital goods, and consumer durables. Though 
emerging Asia is Japan’s largest export market, its imports from Japan largely consist of 
intermediate goods used in the production of final goods destined for the US and Western 
Europe. Second, Japan’s trade dependence had increased since the early 2000s, as 
evidenced by a rising export to gross domestic product ratio and a declining share for the 
non-tradable sector. Though increasing trade openness is a natural part of economic 
globalization and regional integration, the manner in which this process had played out made 
Japan particularly vulnerable to a negative demand shock coming from outside.  
To make Japan more resilient to external shocks, policymakers could promote the export of 
finished goods to emerging Asia by establishing a region-wide free trade arrangement. To 
promote domestic demand, the social protection system needs to be strengthened so as to 
reduce households’ uncertainty for the future; a more liberal immigration policy should help 
invigorate private investment in an aging society. To facilitate a better allocation of 
resources, further deregulatory measures in the more regulated non-tradable goods sector 
are called for; a substantial lifting of restrictions in agriculture, especially regarding the 
corporatization of production, would be especially helpful. With little available fiscal space, 
these measures will help create a climate in which private investment can flourish, driven by 
final domestic demand. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Japan was hit hard by the global financial crisis of 2008-2009; it was the only major 
advanced economy that experienced negative economic growth in 2008 and continues to 
contract sharply in 2009 (Figure 1). Although most advanced countries are now in recession, 
according to the latest World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2009a), the economic contraction that 
Japan will likely experience in 2009 (-6.2%) is forecast to surpass the projected contractions 
for the United States (US) (-2.8%), the Euro Area (-4.2%),
1 and the United Kingdom (-4.1%), 
where the financial crisis for the most part originated. Among the major economies, Japan is 
only surpassed by Singapore (-10.0%) and Taipei,China (-7.5%) in the severity of the real 
impact of the global financial crisis. 
Figure 1: Economic Growth for Selected Countries in 2008 and 2009  
































































































Growth for 2008 Growth forecast for 2009
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2009a). 
When the US subprime loan problem came to the surface in the summer of 2007, many 
observers thought that Japan was immune to the subsequent global deleveraging, given its 
limited exposure to “toxic” assets. Indeed, various indicators suggested that the direct 
financial impact of the global financial crisis on Japan was relatively small. In fact, Japan’s 
banking sector in particular was hardly affected directly, as was evident in the small 
estimated value of write-downs and the limited cost of public sector support which were only 
a fraction of the corresponding amount in the US and Europe (Table 1). 
                                                  
1 The Euro area includes 16 countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. 
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Table 1: The Direct Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the US, Europe, and Japan 
  Credit-related write-downs in the banking 
sector (in billions of US dollars) 
a 
Public outlays for the banking 







a IMF Estimates for 2007-10, as of April 2009. 
 b The magnitude of government actions taken up to 10 June 2009, to intervene in the banking sector.  
c Europe means France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (2009b), Table 1.3; Bank for International Settlements (2009), Table 1.2. 
When the US and much of Europe went into recession in early 2008 (Bosworth and Flaaen 
2009; Wyplosz 2009), Japan’s real economy did not seem to be affected materially. 
However, Japan was adversely affected by the large negative terms of trade shock in 2008, 
with a sharp increase in energy and other commodity prices, but it still maintained positive 
growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) and private fixed investment through the 
second quarter; export growth was steady through the third quarter (Figure 2). It was only in 
the fourth quarter that the evidence of a severe economic contraction was apparent, with a 
12.5% (year-on-year) fall in exports. This was followed by a 36.8% fall in the first quarter of 
2009. Similarly, industrial production also contracted sharply; it declined by 15.0%, 34.0% 
and 27.6% (year-on-year) in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first and second quarters of 
2009, respectively. This decline was one of the worst among the major developed 
countries—in Europe and North America—and Asian economies. When Japan was finally 
hit, the impact was indeed very severe. 
















Exports Private fixed investment Private consumtion Real GDP
Source: Japan Cabinet Office (available: www.esri.cao.jp/jpsna). 
Why was Japan hit so hard by the global financial crisis when its financial system was 
considered much more robust than those in other developed countries? The rest of this 
paper attempts to offer an explanation in the following sequence. Section 2 describes what 
happened in terms of manufacturing production and exports. Section 3 argues that the sharp 
contraction of economic activity occurred largely as a result of the structural changes in the 
Japanese economy that had taken place over the past decade. Section 4 quantifies the 
impact of the structural changes on the responsiveness of Japanese output to global 
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demand shocks by using a vector autoregression (VAR) model of the world economy. 
Finally, Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
2.  WHAT HAPPENED? 
Japanese stock prices reached a recent peak in the summer of 2007 and, with the outbreak 
of the US subprime loan crisis, began a gradual but substantial decline through the fall of 
2008. The decline in stock prices placed a strain on the balance sheet and capital adequacy 
ratios of commercial banks and, as a result, limited their willingness to lend by the summer 
of 2008. The Lehman Brothers shock in September 2008 further depressed the stock market 
and aggravated the strains on Japanese commercial banks. Bank of Japan data indicate that 
new loans for equipment funds declined by 9% (year-on-year) in the third quarter of 2008, 
followed by a 10% decline in the fourth quarter. This, coupled with the lagged impact of the 
negative terms of trade shock (arising from the sharp rise in oil and other commodity prices 
until the summer of 2008), may to some extent explain the sluggishness of industrial activity 
in some sectors starting from the summer of 2008 (see below). 
Even so, overall manufacturing production held up through September and October 2008 
(Figure 3). Notable exceptions were electronic parts and devices as well as transportation 
equipment, the production of which had shown earlier signs of softening. In November, 
however, manufacturing production collapsed precipitously in all major sectors (from 100 in 
October to 93, seasonally adjusted). Overall manufacturing production continued to fall and 
reached 70 in February 2009 before recovering somewhat. The collapse was even more 
spectacular for transportation equipment (52 in February 2009 compared with 110 in 
September 2008) and general machinery (59 compared with 99). The production of general 
machinery remained depressed even after production began to pick up in other sectors from 
the spring of 2009. 

































































































Total manufacturing General machinery
Electrical machinery Electronic parts and devices
Transportation equipment
Source: Ministry of Economy and Industry (available: www.meti.go.jp/statistics/tyo/iip). 
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The downward movement of industrial production closely followed the downward movement 
of exports. Although the major factor behind the collapse of Japanese exports was a world-
wide shrinkage of demand and trade following the Lehman shock, the sharp appreciation of 
the yen was an additional blow to Japan’s export-oriented firms.
2 The total value of exports, 
which stood at 7,360 billion yen (¥) in September 2008, declined moderately to ¥6,915 billion 
in October and collapsed thereafter. Exports in January 2009, at ¥3,480 billion, were less 
than 50% of the previous peak in September 2008. The decline was across the board, but 
most pronounced in the export of industrial supplies, capital equipment, and consumer 
durables, Japan’s three main categories of export products (which together account for over 
90% of Japan’s total exports). The decline was also registered not only for exports to the US 
and Western Europe (which together account for over 40% of Japan’s total exports), where 
the financial crisis originated, but also for exports to emerging and developing Asia, Japan’s 
largest export market now accounting for over 50% of total exports (Figures 4–6). 



































































































Industrial supplies Capital equipment Consumer durables
 
Sources: Japan Tariff Association (2007, 2008, and 2009) (available: kanzei.or.jp/English/index.htm). 
                                                  
2 The nominal value of the yen appreciated by 17% against the US dollar and by 27% against the euro, from 
September 2008 to January 2009. 
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Industrial supplies Capital equipment Consumer durables
 
Sources: Japan Tariff Association (2007, 2008, and 2009) (available: kanzei.or.jp/English/index.htm). 




































































































Industrial supplies Capital equipment Consumer durables
 
Sources: Japan Tariff Association (2007, 2008, and 2009) (available: kanzei.or.jp/English/index.htm). 
Of the decline in exports of ¥3,880 billion from September 2008 to January 2009, emerging 
(and developing) Asia accounted for over 51%, which is roughly the share of emerging Asia 
in Japan’s total exports. This implies that Japanese exports collapsed almost uniformly 
across destination markets. The composition of export declines, however, differed across 
regions, reflecting the different content of trade. Within emerging Asia, 86% of the decline 
was in industrial supplies and capital goods, whereas this share for the US and Western 
Europe was smaller at 60%. On the other hand, only 6% of the export decline for emerging 
Asia was consumer durables, while the share for the advanced markets was larger at 36%.
3 
This is a reflection of the fact that, though emerging Asia is the largest export market, it is not 
                                                  
3  US imports, on a customs basis, declined by more than 30% from July to December 2008; the import of 
transportation equipment showed an even sharper decline of about 40%. 
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the dominant market for consumer durables; more consumer durables are shipped to the 
advanced markets of the US and Western Europe. 
Essentially, the export of industrial supplies and capital goods to emerging Asia was most 
severely affected as the region’s demand for Japanese parts, components, and capital 
goods—all critical inputs for the production of final consumer products—declined steeply. 
Japan was affected by the shrinkage of “triangular trade” where Japan and the Asian newly 
industrialized economies (the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea), Singapore, and 
Taipei,China) export parts and components to the PRC and other emerging Asian 
economies, which in turn assemble them to produce final products for the US and European 
markets. Thus, Japanese exports collapsed because both the export of consumer durables 
to the advanced markets and the export of industrial supplies and capital goods to emerging 
Asia fell sharply, as a consequence of the contraction of private consumption and the 
softening of investment spending in the US and Europe. 
3.  WHY IT HAPPENED 
There are two aspects to the mechanism whereby Japan’s output was so much affected by 
the collapse of exports in late 2008 and early 2009, Japan’s trade structure and its industrial 
structure. We will examine each of these. 
3.1  Japan’s Trade Structure 
As noted in the previous section, over 90% of Japanese exports consist of highly income-
elastic industrial supplies, capital goods, and consumer durables. Hence a collapse of the 
US and European markets exerted a severe negative influence on Japanese exports. Japan 
was not alone in this. Sommer (2009) shows that economies with a greater share of 
advanced manufacturing in GDP tended to experience sharper output declines than others, 
with Singapore and Taipei,China belonging to this group of economies. In Japan, as 
discussed above, both the export of consumer durables to the advanced markets 
(accounting for less than 15% of total exports) and the export of industrial supplies and 
capital goods to emerging Asia (constituting over 40% of total exports) were adversely and 
severely affected by the financial crisis. In particular, the export of industrial supplies and 
capital goods declined along with the softening of investment demand throughout the world. 
Much has been said about the recent growth of intra-regional trade within Asia (see Kawai 
and Urata 2004; Takagi and Kozuru 2009). For example, within the member countries of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the PRC, Japan, and Korea (ASEAN+3), 
the share of intra-regional trade rose from around 30% during 1980-1990 to over 38% in 
2006; with Hong Kong, China and Taipei,China included, the share was almost 55%. Closely 
related to intra-regional trade is intra-regional foreign direct investment (FDI), which has 
recently accounted for as much as half of the region’s total FDI. Direct investment in plant 
and equipment has created production networks and supply chains in industries such as 
electronics, automobiles, and other machinery products, that cut across national borders—a 
flipside of the growing intra-regional trade. Japan has been the center of this increasing 
intra-regional trade, mainly in parts, components, and capital equipment. This explains why 
Japanese exports to emerging Asia expanded sharply over the last two decades (Figure 7), 
with the share of exports to emerging Asia in total exports rising from 34% in 1990 to 54% in 
2008.
4 
                                                  
4 In contrast the share of exports to the US and Europe declined precipitously from 55% to 35% over the same 
period. 
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Sources: Japan Tariff Association, The Summary Report of Trade of Japan, Monthly issues 1990–2009. (Available: 
kanzei.or.jp/English/index.htm.) 
3.2  Japan’s Industrial Structure 
The industrial structure of Japan has undergone significant changes over the past twenty 
years. In particular it changed since around 2005 as the real effective exchange rate of the 
yen finally returned to a level more consistent with the long-run average (Figure 8). The yen, 
which had begun to appreciate in real effective terms in early 1985, peaked in 1995 when 
the level was some 80% higher than in 1980. Then the yen began to decline as a trend until 
2007, except for the brief 1999-2001 period when the value rose temporarily.
5 
                                                  
5 When the yen began to appreciate sharply following the Plaza Accord, there was a contraction of manufacturing 
activity. The Japanese policymakers reacted by expanding both fiscal and monetary policies. Coupled with the 
favorable terms of trade changes (caused by a fall in energy and commodity prices) at the time, these policy 
actions allowed economic growth to pick up from the fall of 1987 but subsequently led to the emergence of a 
bubble economy, with sharp rises in stock, real estate and other asset prices. Monetary policy then was 
reversed. 
With a bursting of the bubble economy in 1991, the Japanese economy decelerated and, in 1992, entered a 
prolonged period of stagnation. Annual growth over the next decade averaged less than 1% , compared with 
over 4% during the previous decade. Growth appeared to pick up in 1995-1996, only to fall back. In 1998, in 
the midst of a systemic banking crisis, a severe recession set in and the economy contracted in 1998 and 
1999. The stagnation was compounded by sustained deflationary pressure; annual Consumer Price Index 
inflation averaged less than 1% over the “lost decade.” Although annual economic growth finally exceeded 2% 
in 2003 and 2004, this moderate recovery did not end the deflation. The corporate goods price level was 13 % 
lower in 2003 than in 1991. 
During the prolonged period of stagnation, the authorities eased both fiscal and monetary policies substantially to 
support domestic demand and to fend off deflationary pressure. The general government balance, which was 
in small surpluses in the early 1990s, deteriorated sharply; it has been in deficit every year since 1993—with 
deficits exceeding 7% of GDP in virtually every year from 1999 to 2003. As a result, the balance of gross public 
debt rose from about 70% of GDP in the early 1990s to over 180% in 2005. As to monetary policy, the BOJ 
lowered the discount rate in several steps from 4.5% in December 1991 to 0.5% in September 1995. With no 
additional room left to maneuver, in February 1999, it reduced the overnight call rate to virtually zero, a policy it 
continued to follow until March 2006, except for the brief period of August 2000–March 2001. A new framework 
of “quantitative easing”—with the de facto “zero” policy rate—was adopted in March 2001. 
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Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics online database; Bank for International Settlements 
online database (available: www.bis.org/statistics/eer); and Bank of Japan online database (available: 
www.boj.or.jp.theme/research/stat/market/forex). 
During the period of the “lost decade,” the share of the non-tradable goods sector in the 
Japanese economy expanded, in a way consistent with the real exchange rate level that was 
higher than the historical average. From theoretical perspectives, a high real value of the yen 
increases the relative price of non-tradable goods, thus encouraging their production; 
resources therefore should shift away from the production of tradable goods. This relative 
price change, moreover, should reduce the price competitiveness of manufacturing firms that 
produce tradable goods, so that it also encourages them to shift their production activities 
abroad through FDI. Indeed, this is what we observed. 
Figure 9 depicts the production of non-tradable goods relative to tradable goods from 1980 
to 2007 in terms of both nominal and real outputs; the two solid lines represent the 
respective trend lines (for our purposes here the non-tradable goods sectors include 
construction, electricity, gas, water, wholesale and retail trade, banking and insurance, real 
estate, transportation, telecommunication, and services; the tradable goods sector includes 
manufacturing). The figure clearly indicates that the share of the non-tradable goods sector 
rose steadily over this period in terms of nominal value, although the rise in the share of non-
tradable goods was not pronounced when measured in terms of real value (reflecting the 
relatively more rapid growth of non-tradable goods prices). An important point is that, during 
the period of a strong yen, i.e., 1993–2002, the production of non-tradable goods relative to 
tradable goods exceeded the trend, regardless of whether it is measured in nominal or real 
value. 
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Trend line Trend line
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Cabinet Office, National Income Accounts. 
What is more important to observe for our purpose is that, the share of non-tradable goods 
began to decline from a peak achieved in 2002. When Japan began slowly to emerge out of 
the prolonged recession, it relied on the export sector as an engine of growth as the yen fell 
in real effective terms, especially given the limited space for expansionary fiscal policy. As a 
result, not only did the GDP share of exports increase, but also Japan’s overall openness 
rose from the early 2000s to 2008 when the country was hit by the global financial crisis 
(Table 2). For instance, Japan’s export to GDP ratio, which was 11% in 2000, rose to over 
17% in 2008. Over the same period, trade openness increased from about 20% of GDP to 
almost 35%. 
Table 2: Japan’s Exports, Imports, Net Exports, and Trade Openness (in % of GDP) 
  Exports  Imports  Net exports  Trade openness
a 
1995 9.1  7.7 1.4 16.8
1996 9.8  9.3 0.5 19.2
1997 10.9  9.8 1.1 20.6
1998 10.9  9.0 1.9 19.9
1999 10.3  8.7 1.6 19.0
2000 11.0  9.5 1.5 20.5
2001 10.6  9.9 0.6 20.5
2002 11.4  10.1 1.3 21.4
2003 12.0  10.4 1.6 22.4
2004 13.3  11.4 1.9 24.7
2005 14.3  12.9 1.4 27.3
2006 16.1  14.9 1.3 31.0
2007 17.6  15.9 1.7 33.5
2008 17.4  17.3 0.1 34.7
Note: 
a Defined as (exports+imports)/GDP. 
Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (available: www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna). 
Although net exports did not show an upward trend during this period, they positively 
contributed to economic growth when there was a withdrawal of fiscal stimulus from 2003 to 
2006 (Table 3). Undoubtedly, the export-led recovery and growth was made possible by the 
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expansion of the global economy, particularly that of the US economy that followed the post-
IT bubble recession. The restructuring of the banking sector and the resolution of bank 
nonperforming loans also likely supported the recovery process in Japan. This export-led 
growth, however, became increasingly vulnerable to US economic turbulence because the 
export expansion was being fueled by an unsustainable increase in US personal 
consumption backed by the housing price bubble, a bubble that eventually burst in the 
summer of 2006 and led to the subsequent eruption of the global financial crisis. 
Table 3: Contribution to Real GDP Growth (in % annual growth rate) 
  Real GDP growth  Domestic demand  Net exports 
Private sector  Public sector 
1995 1.5  1.5  0.6  -0.6 
1996 2.3  2.0  0.8  -0.5 
1997 1.3  0.9  -0.5  1.0 
1998 -2.1  -2.3  -0.1  0.3 
1999 -0.3  -1.2  1.1  -0.1 
2000 2.7  2.3  -0.0  0.4 
2001 0.2  0.7  0.3  -0.8 
2002 0.3  -0.5  0.1  0.7 
2003 1.7  1.3  -0.2  0.6 
2004 3.1  2.4  -0.1  0.8 
2005 2.3  2.4  -0.2  0.1 
2006 1.8  1.5  -0.2  0.6 
2007  3.5  2.2 0.1 1.2 
Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (Available: www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna). 
4.  QUANTIFYING THE NATURE OF THE STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE 
How these changes in Japan’s trade and industrial structures may have affected the 
response of the Japanese economy to global demand shocks can be analyzed by a vector 
autoregression (VAR) technique. VAR is a standard statistical procedure to investigate how 
shocks are transmitted from one entity to another.  Using this statistical technique, we 
examined the impact of a shock that originates within Japan (a Japan shock), within 
emerging Asia (an emerging Asia shock), and in the rest of the world (a global shock), in 
order to see how changes in Japan’s economic structure over the past decade or so affected 
the responsiveness of its GDP to supply or demand shocks originating abroad.
6 
For convenience, we used the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 to divide the sample. We 
then used two measures of the responsiveness of Japanese GDP to global and Asian 
shocks. The first measure is the response to a one-standard deviation shock to the global 
and regional outputs. The second measure is the extent to which the total variance is 
explained by the variance of respective shocks. In order to quantify the nature of the 
structural change that may have taken place in Japan over the past decade, we compared 
these measures obtained from the pre-crisis and post-crisis samples. It should be noted, 
however, that VAR only helps uncover temporal statistical relationships among several 
variables but gives no indication of how and why they affect each other. 
Consider the following moving average (MA) representation of the VAR model, which 
consists of three equations representing global, Japanese, and emerging Asian outputs: 
                                                  
6   Takagi and Kozuru (2009) used the same methodology and data set to analyze the macroeconomic 
interdependence of Asia. 
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Xt = Σφ1j ut-j  + Σφ2j vt-j  + Σφ3j wt-j         (1) 
Yt = Σλ1j ut-j  + Σλ2jvt-j   + Σλ3jwt-j          (2) 
Zt = Ση1jut-j   + Ση2jvt-j   + Ση3jwt-j         (3) 
where Xt is real GDP in the US and Europe (henceforth referred to as “global”), Yt real GDP 
in Japan, and Zt real GDP in emerging Asia, all expressed as indices in order to remove the 
influence of nominal exchange rate changes; u, v and w are, respectively, a shock to global 
GDP (a global shock), a shock to Japanese GDP (a Japan shock), and a shock to emerging 
Asia’s GDP (an emerging Asia shock). We are particularly interested in examining the 
pattern of response of Japanese GDP (Y) to the past global and emerging Asia shocks, 
before and after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. 
The simplified setup of equations (1)–(3) is dictated by the small number of observations, 
especially when the data are divided into the pre-Asian crisis and the post-Asian crisis 
period. Even with this simple setup, various data limitations have restricted the coverage of 
countries as well as the choice of sample.
7 The results reported below are based on the 
assumptions that in the long run global GDP affects both Japanese and emerging Asian 
GDPs; Japanese GDP affects only emerging Asian GDP; and emerging Asian GDP affects 
neither. In the short run, all the GDPs affect each other. We have verified, however, that the 
substantive results are robust to the choice of ordering. Lag length is determined by the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The pre-crisis period refers to Q1:1988–Q4:1996, while 
the post-crisis period covers Q1:1999–Q4:2006. 
Figure 10 shows the responses of Japanese GDP to a one-standard deviation shock to 
global, Japan, and emerging Asia GDP. Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Japanese 
GDP did not respond significantly to a global shock (in each graph, the red dotted lines 
indicate a confidence interval). In the post- crisis period, however, Japan’s output became 
significantly responsive to a global shock, while the response to its own shock declined 
significantly. There was little change in the responsiveness to an emerging Asia shock 
across the two samples. 
                                                  
7 The sample countries include: (i) for Asia, in addition to Japan; PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; 
Korea; Malaysia, Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand; and (ii) for the rest of the world, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the US, and the United Kingdom. Global and regional GDPs 
(or prices) are the weighted averages of the individual country GDPs (or prices) in the respective regions, with 
2000 US$-GDPs used as the weights. The underlying data comes from the IMF, International Financial 
Statistics online database; for Taipei,China only, the central bank of Taipei,China, Financial Statistics Monthly, 
monthly issues. 
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Figure 10: Impulse Responses of Japanese GDP: 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Next, Figure 11 indicates the variance of Japanese GDP that can be explained by a global 
shock, a Japan shock, and an emerging Asia shock. Before the Asian financial crisis of 
1997-1998, virtually 100% of the variance of Japanese GDP was explained by a Japan 
shock alone. Global and emerging Asia shocks had no role. In the post-crisis period, 
however, the portion explainable by a global shock increased significantly (to about 40% 
after a few quarters), with little change observed for the emerging Asia shock. Consistent 
with the impulse response analysis reported above, global GDP shocks tend to have a much 
more significant impact on Japanese GDP in recent years. As a result, the variance of 
Japanese GDP can be explained almost equally by Japan and global shocks. 
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Figure 11: Variance Decomposition of Japanese GDP: 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Japan was hit hard by the global financial crisis even though its relatively resilient financial 
system initially limited the direct impact. The severe collapse of industrial production that 
followed was no doubt attributable to a confluence of factors, including the stock price 
declines that eroded the capital base of commercial banks and thus limited their willingness 
to lend as well as the lagged impact of the sharp rise in oil and other commodity prices in the 
summer of 2008. As a primary cause of the severe recession, however, this paper has 
highlighted the impact that came from the contractionary effect of global deleveraging on the 
real economy. In this environment, Japan was particularly vulnerable because of the 
structural changes that had taken place over the past decade in its trade and industrial 
structures. VAR analysis has confirmed that, as a result of these structural changes, 
Japanese output became much more responsive to output shocks in the advanced markets 
of the US and Western Europe. 
Japan’s structural changes had two components. First, over 90% of Japan’s exports 
consisted of highly income-elastic industrial supplies, capital goods, and consumer durables. 
Though emerging Asia is Japan’s largest export market, the region’s imports from Japan 
largely consist of industrial supplies and capital goods that are necessary at least in part for 
the production of final consumer goods destined for the advanced markets of the US and 
Western Europe. Asia’s intra-regional trade had expanded rapidly until the outbreak of the 
global financial crisis, with Japan as the most important supplier of foreign direct investment 
and technology intensive products, but much of it had been in the trade of parts, 
components, and capital equipment. With final demand coming from the developed markets 
outside the region, the demand contraction in these developed economies due to global 
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deleveraging had direct and secondary impacts on Japan—and other similar emerging 
economies like Korea, Singapore and Taipei,China. 
Second, Japan’s trade dependence had increased since the early 2000s, as evidenced by a 
rising export to GDP ratio and a declining share of the non-tradable sector. This was induced 
by the return of the real effective exchange rate of the yen to a level more in line with the 
long-run average, allowing the Japanese economy to finally come out of a decade-long 
stagnation. Fundamentally, increasing trade openness can be thought of as a natural part of 
the process of economic globalization and regional integration that has been advancing 
throughout the world and especially in Asia. But the manner in which this process played out 
made Japan particularly vulnerable to a large output shock coming from outside.  
In looking to the future, one must make a distinction between the outcome of the natural 
process of economic globalization and integration, of which Japan has been a part, and the 
need to manage that process. As Japan continues to integrate with the regional and global 
economies, as it should, a rise in the ratio of exports to GDP is likely to continue; a share of 
emerging Asia in Japan’s total exports may well continue to increase, especially as the 
region’s income levels rise. What matters is the geographical and product diversification of 
the likely increases in exports. To make Japan more resilient to external shocks, 
policymakers could create enabling environments to stimulate the export of finished goods to 
emerging Asia, for example, through the establishment of a region-wide free trade 
arrangement. In this context, it is instructive to note the experience of Germany during the 
current crisis. Although Japan and Germany share similar industrial structures, German 
industrial production did not decline as much despite the fact that its export dependence was 
even greater than that of Japan.
8 
Domestically, there is no rational ground where one can advocate a policy of reducing trade 
openness just to minimize vulnerability to external shocks. Japan, as a relatively large 
economy, however, cannot rely on external demand alone to sustain its economic growth 
over the medium-term. To the extent that there are impediments that may inhibit the 
vigorous expansion of domestic demand or the non-tradable goods sector, policy needs to 
address them. To promote domestic demand, the social sector protection system (for 
education, health, unemployment, and pensions) needs to be substantially reformed so as to 
reduce households’ uncertainty for the future. To promote a better allocation of resources 
between the more regulated non-tradable goods sector (such as medical, health, and young- 
and old-age caretaking) and the less regulated tradable goods sector, further deregulatory 
measures are called for. A substantial lifting of restrictions in agriculture, especially the 
corporatization of agricultural production, would be especially helpful. More liberal 
immigration policy should help invigorate private investment in an aging society. With little 
available fiscal space, these and other measures will help create a climate in which private 
investment can flourish, driven by final domestic demand. 
                                                  
8 German industrial production did not decline noticeably during the last quarter of 2008; even during the first 
quarter of 2009, the decline was around 20% from a year earlier—significantly less than Japan’s decline(IMF, 
International Financial Statistics online database). 
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